Behavioral games
Run a Prisoner’s Dilemma
Compare cooperation and defection under a payoff matrix that preserves the game’s strategic ordering.
The basic idea
A Prisoner's Dilemma requires temptation to defect to exceed mutual cooperation, which exceeds mutual defection, which exceeds the sucker payoff. The matrix—not the labels—creates the dilemma, so validation must preserve that ordering.
Use payoffs T=5, R=3, P=1, S=0 and compare cooperation across one-shot human–human, model–model, and mixed pairs.
How to do it
- 1
Assign two seats and choose human or model actors.
- 2
Set temptation, reward, punishment, and sucker payoffs while preserving T > R > P > S.
- 3
Choose one-shot or repeated play and specify between-round feedback.
- 4
Report joint action frequencies and payoffs, not only the overall cooperation percentage.
What to watch for
- An invalid payoff ordering is not a Prisoner's Dilemma.
- Repeated play permits contingent strategies unavailable in a one-shot game.
- Public rationales can change the game by adding communication.
What a useful result looks like
Every round yields a simultaneous action pair and two matrix-derived payoffs under a validated strategic structure.